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COMPARATIVE CASE NOTE 
 
The U.S. and German Interpretations of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:  









On September 19, 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) considered two important 
questions with respect to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR): whether the VCCR is self-executing1 and whether 
German courts have a constitutional obligation to take into account a 
competent international court‘s interpretation of a treaty.2 The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht answered yes to both questions.3 
About one and a half years later in Medellín v. Texas,4 a sharply 
 
† Editor-in-Chief, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10; J.D., 
University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010. 
1. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 
2006, 2 BvR 2115/01, para. 53 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter BVerfG Case], available at 
http://www.Bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20060919_2bvr211501
.html.  
2. Id. para. 48. 
3. Id. The Bundesverfassungsgericht asserted in dictum that the VCCR is a self-
executing treaty. Its resolution on Germany‘s constitutional obligations was a 
holding. 
4. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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divided U.S. Supreme Court5 did not resolve the question of whether 
the VCCR is self-executing6 but found that U.S. courts must give 
only ―respectful consideration‖ to the interpretation of a treaty 
rendered by a competent international court.7 
This Note aims to underscore and explain the contrast between the 
U.S. Supreme Court‘s purportedly narrow view of international law 
and the ―more cosmopolitan approach‖ of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.8  
Part I provides a brief overview of the two primary cases under 
consideration, the Bundesverfassungsgericht case and Medellín v. 
Texas. Part II sets out some of the important legal background to the 
cases, namely the VCCR and its Optional Protocol; two decisions of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), LaGrand and Avena; and two 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Breard v. Greene and Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon. Part III describes the respective approaches of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the U.S. Supreme Court on three 
closely related issues: whether the VCCR is self-executing, whether 
the ICJ‘s judgment on a VCCR claim is binding on domestic courts, 
and whether a domestic court must follow the ICJ‘s interpretation of 
the VCCR. Part IV suggests that the courts reached different 
conclusions on these issues because they applied different law—not 
because they have different dispositions toward international law. 
I. THE CASES 
A. The Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 
The appellant,9 a Turkish national, was arrested on suspicion of 
 
5. Both Medellin, 552 U.S. at 496, and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 
331, 335 (2006), featured a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and 
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; a concurrence in the 
judgment by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, respectively; and a principal dissent 
written by Justice Breyer, joined in Medellin by Justices Souter and Ginsburg and 
in Sanchez-Llamas by Justices Stevens, Souter, and, in part, Ginsburg. 
6. 552 U.S. at 506 n.4.  
7. Id. at 513 n.9 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per 
curiam)). 
8. Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts—The United 
States Supreme Court Decides to Enforce the I.C.J.’s Avena Judgment Relating to a 
U.S. Obligation Under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERMAN L.J. 619, 
637 (2008). 
9. For the sake of simplicity, this Note considers only the facts relating to the 
first appellant. Thus, the analysis reads as if there were only one appellant in the 
case, though in fact there were several. Also, since the appellant is not mentioned in 
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murder pursuant to a warrant issued by the local court of 
Braunschweig.10 At the time of his arrest, the police—who were 
aware that the suspect was a Turkish national—notified him of his 
rights to remain silent and to an attorney but not of his right under 
Article 36 of the VCCR11 to contact the Turkish consulate.12 The 
custodial judge13 informed the accused only of his rights under the 
rules of German criminal procedure.14  
At trial, the defendant availed himself of his right to remain 
silent.15 The court found the defendant guilty on the basis of, among 
other things, his statements to police during interrogation.16 The 
regional court sentenced the defendant to life in prison.17  
In a decision on November 7, 2001, the German Federal Court of 
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) rejected as unsubstantiated the Turkish 
national‘s final criminal appeal.18 The Bundesgerichtshof explained 
that foreign criminal defendants are guaranteed sufficient protection 
by the right to a defense attorney and the Aussagefreiheit—that is, the 
right of the accused to either remain silent or make a statement.19 
Additional protection, according to the Bundesgerichtshof, would 
afford the foreign criminal defendant an unjustified privilege 
compared to other criminal defendants.20  
Having exhausted all criminal appeals, the Turkish national 
appealed his case to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, claiming that the 
Bundesgerichtshof had violated its constitutional duty to take into 
 
the case by name, this Note refers to him by his status in the various stages of his 
legal proceedings. 
10. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 22. 
11. The VCCR requires the competent authorities of the receiving state to 
inform the foreign detainee without delay of his right to communicate with the 
consular post of his state of origin. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 
36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292 [hereinafter 
VCCR]. 
12. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 22. 
13. The custodial judge (Haftrichter) generally presides over the defendant‘s 
arraignment. 
14. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 22. Specifically, the judge informed the 
accused of his rights pursuant to § 136 Abs. 1 Satz 2 StPO. Id. 
15. Id. para. 24. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. para. 23. 
18. Id. para. 26. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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account the ICJ‘s interpretation of Article 36 in the LaGrand and 
Avena cases.21 
B. Medellín v. Texas 
José Ernesto Medellín, one of the Mexican nationals named in the 
ICJ‘s Avena decision, was convicted and sentenced in Texas state 
court for murder.22 Relying in part on the ICJ‘s decision in Avena, 
Medellín filed for a writ of habeas corpus.23 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals dismissed the application as an abuse of the writ 
under state law, finding that Medellín had violated state procedural-
default rules by raising his Article 36 claim for the first time on 
appeal.24  
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the ICJ‘s decision in Avena constitutes directly enforceable domestic 
law in U.S. state courts.25 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations & Its Optional 
Protocol 
The VCCR was drafted in 1963 to ―contribute to the development 
of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing 
constitutional and social systems.‖26 Article 36 of the VCCR explains 
the circumstances under which a foreign national has a right to 
contact and communicate with the consulate of his home state. 
Article 36(1)(b) states that, when a national of one country is 
detained by the authorities of another, the authorities must both notify 
the consulate of the detainee‘s home state if the detainee so requests 
and inform the detainee without delay of his rights to contact and 
communicate with his home consulate.27 The United States ratified 
 
21. Id. para. 34. 
22. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. This Note does not discuss the other issue in Medellín, namely whether 
the President‘s Memorandum independently requires states to provide review and 
reconsideration of the claims of the fifty-one Mexican nationals named in Avena 
without regard to state procedural-default rules. Id. 
26. VCCR, supra note 11, 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262; Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006). 
27. VCCR, supra note 11, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292; Sanchez-
Llamas, 548 U.S. at 338–39. 
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the VCCR in 1969.28 
In the same year, the United States also ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the VCCR, which provides that ―[d]isputes arising out of 
the interpretation or application of the [VCCR] shall lie within the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice . . . .‖29 
Although the United States had thus consented to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ on matters arising out of the VCCR, the United 
States withdrew from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005, 
subsequent to the ICJ‘s decision in Avena.30 
B. The ICJ Decisions and Their Implications  
1. The LaGrand and Avena Cases 
The LaGrand case involved two German nationals living in the 
United States. Karl and Walter LaGrand were arrested on suspicion 
of armed robbery and murder, convicted, and sentenced to death by 
the Arizona state courts.31 At trial, the LaGrands‘ court-appointed 
counsel neither contacted the German consular authorities nor raised 
the issue of noncompliance with Article 36.32 Before Germany filed a 
complaint against the United States in the ICJ, Karl LaGrand was 
executed on February 24, 1999.33 On March 2, 1999, the ICJ issued 
an order to the United States to ―take all measures at its disposal to 
ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision 
in [the ICJ] proceedings.‖34 Despite this order, Walter LaGrand was 
executed on March 3, 1999.35 
The ICJ held in LaGrand that, where law-enforcement authorities 
have failed to notify a foreign detainee of his right to contact and 
communicate with his home consulate and the foreign detainee is 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to a severe penalty, the 
receiving state must provide ―review and reconsideration‖ of the 
conviction and the sentence by means of the state‘s own choosing, 
 
28. VCCR, supra note 11, 21 U.S.T. at 77, 596 U.N.T.S. at 261. 
29. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, 
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488. 
30. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008). 
31. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475 (June 27). 
32. Id. at 476. 
33. Id. at 478. 
34. Id. at 479. 
35. Id. at 479–80. 
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taking into account the violation of Article 36.36  
The LaGrand judgment thus ―broke new ground‖ in two respects.37 
First, the ICJ had never before asserted that a state could be held 
accountable for failing to comply with the VCCR in the 
administration of the state‘s criminal laws.38 Second, the ICJ directed 
a sovereign state to incorporate into its domestic legal system a 
―specific new procedural step‖—namely ―review and 
reconsideration‖—but left the means of carrying out this order to the 
discretion of the state.39 By allowing the United States this flexibility, 
the ICJ substantially increased the likelihood that the United States 
would bring its conduct into compliance with the ICJ‘s interpretation 
of the VCCR.40 Indeed, a compliance order leaving the United States 
no discretion might have incited the United States to simply withdraw 
from the VCCR and disclaim its accompanying consular obligations. 
In Avena, Mexico filed a claim against the United States in the ICJ 
arguing that the United States had failed to notify fifty-four Mexican 
nationals of their rights under Article 36 of the VCCR.41 Mexico 
further argued that the United States was required to take the steps 
―necessary and sufficient‖ to ensure that the provisions of its 
municipal law gave ―full effect‖ to the purposes of Article 36.42 The 
ICJ agreed, holding that the United States had committed 
―internationally wrongful acts‖ in failing to notify the Mexican 
detainees and the Mexican consular posts and that the remedy to 
―make good‖ these violations was review and reconsideration of each 
Mexican national‘s case by a U.S. court ―with a view to ascertaining‖ 
whether the Article 36 violation ―caused actual prejudice‖ to the 
defendant.43 
The ICJ reasoned that the defendants may have procedurally 
defaulted their claims at least in part because the American 
 
36. Id. at 514. 
37. Jacob Katz Cogan, AALS Panel—The Avena Case at the International Court 
of Justice (Mexico v. United States)—Arguments of the United States, 5 GERMAN 




41. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12, 20–21 (Mar. 31). 
42. Id. at 20. 
43. Id. at 59–60. 
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authorities had failed to notify them of their rights under Article 36.44 
In such a situation, application of procedural-default rules violates 
Article 36 because it prevents full effect from being given to the 
Article‘s purposes.45 
2. The Implications of LaGrand and Avena 
The United States‘ argument before the ICJ in both LaGrand and 
Avena can be summarized as follows: the ICJ lacked the jurisdiction 
to pronounce on matters of U.S. domestic law.46 In particular, the 
United States asserted that U.S. courts have the final say on whether 
to apply procedural-default rules in domestic criminal proceedings.47 
The ICJ disagreed, explaining that, while the application of 
procedural-default rules is not itself a violation of Article 36, ―[t]he 
problem arises‖ when such application prevents a detainee from 
exercising his Article 36 rights.48 
Article 36(2) of the VCCR provides that the consular rights 
protected in Article 36(1) ―shall be exercised in conformity with the 
laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, 
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to 
be given to the purposes for which [those] rights . . . are intended.‖49  
The United States argued that the ICJ was essentially ―play[ing] 
the role of ultimate court of criminal appeal in national criminal 
proceedings . . . .‖50 On this theory, while Article 36(1) may create 
judicially enforceable rights, these rights––just like the rights 
protected under the U.S. Constitution––must nevertheless be asserted 
within the framework of U.S. criminal procedure.  
In contrast, the ICJ maintained that, pursuant to Article 36(2), it 
necessarily has the jurisdiction to examine the actions of U.S. courts 
―in the light of international law‖; otherwise the ICJ would be unable 
 
44. Id. at 57. 
45. Id. 
46. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 485 (June 27); Avena, 2004 
I.C.J. at 33. 
47. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 485. In Avena, the ICJ understood U.S. procedural-
default rules to mean that ―a defendant who could have raised, but fails to raise, a 
legal issue at trial will generally not be permitted to raise it in future proceedings, 
on appeal or in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.‖ 2004 I.C.J. at 56. 
48. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 56 (citing LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497). 
49. VCCR, supra note 11, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 274. 
50. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 485. 
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to determine whether the United States had violated the VCCR.51 
Thus, according to the ICJ, the international legal rights created by 
the VCCR supersede the domestic legal requirements of U.S. 
criminal procedure. 
How severe were these violations of the rights created by Article 
36(1) of the VCCR? On one hand, one might judge the importance of 
a right based on whether it has attained the status of an international 
human right. On the other hand, one might take a more practical 
approach and focus on whether the right is enforceable. 
Both Germany and Mexico asserted that the right to consular 
protection was a human right; but as two commentators explain, 
Mexico might have done better not to have forced the issue.52 
Germany and Mexico had good reason to make the claim, for the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights had noted in a 1999 advisory 
opinion that ―Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations . . . is part of the body of international human rights law.‖53 
In LaGrand, the ICJ limited itself to the narrow issue of whether the 
United States had violated Article 36(1) of the VCCR. Having 
answered this question in the affirmative, the ICJ declined to 
pronounce on whether the right to consular assistance is a 
fundamental human right.54 Former ICJ President Sir Robert Jennings 
applauded the ICJ‘s exercise of judicial restraint, commenting that 
―all international lawyers should give heartfelt thanks‖ for the court‘s 
forbearance.55 
In Avena, however, neither Mexico nor the ICJ observed the 
wisdom of the Latin phrase si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses.56 
Rather, Mexico pushed the ICJ to declare that the right to consular 
 
51. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 30. 
52. Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin—a 
Rocky Road Toward Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 7, 11–12 (2005). 
53. I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the 
Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-
16/99 of Oct. 1, 1999, Series A no. 16, at 64,  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_16_ing.pdf; Simma & Hoppe, 
supra note 52, at 12. 
54. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514. 
55. Sir Robert Jennings, The LaGrand Case, 1 L. & PRAC. INT‘L CT. & 
TRIBUNALS 13, 27 (2002); Simma & Hoppe, supra note 52, at 12. 
56. Simma & Hoppe, supra note 52, at 12. The Latin phrase, attributed to the 
fifth-sixth century philosopher Boethius, means, ―if you had been silent, you would 
have remained a philosopher.‖ 
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assistance is a fundamental human right, even though the court had 
already declined to decide the issue on nearly identical facts in 
LaGrand.57 The ICJ, for its part, failed to exercise the restraint for 
which it was commended after LaGrand. Indeed, the court ―shut the 
door rather forcefully‖58 on the claim that consular rights have 
attained the status of international human rights, noting that, though it 
need not decide the issue, neither the text nor the object and purpose 
of the VCCR, nor any indication in the preparatory work,59 supports 
this assertion.60 
Although Mexico‘s overzealous approach may have backfired, 
perhaps the status of the rights is not as important as one might think. 
―What matters,‖ write the aforementioned commentators, ―is that one 
has an individual right that one can assert and which is enforceable in 
the domestic courts of the receiving State, not whether [the] right is 
of an otherwise elevated or universal nature.‖61 
C. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in the Context of International 
Law 
1. Breard v. Greene and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 
In 1998—before both LaGrand and Avena—the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Breard v. Greene that a Paraguayan national‘s failure to 
raise an Article 36 claim in Virginia state court prevented him from 
raising the claim in a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding.62 
The per curiam opinion in Breard famously (or infamously) declared 
that, while the interpretation of an international treaty by a competent 
international court is entitled to ―respectful consideration,‖ ―it has 
been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express 
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State 
govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.‖63  
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon arose in part from the arrest and 
conviction of Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, for first-degree 
 
57. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12, 20 (Mar. 31); Simma & Hoppe, supra note 52, at 12. 
58. Simma & Hoppe, supra note 52, at 13. 
59. The ICJ used the term travaux preparatoires, which translates from the 
French as ―preparatory work.‖ 
60. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 61; Simma & Hoppe, supra note 52, at 13. 
61. Simma & Hoppe, supra note 52, at 13. 
62. 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). 
63. Id. 
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murder.64 After Bustillo‘s conviction and sentence were affirmed on 
appeal, a Virginia state court rejected as procedurally barred 
Bustillo‘s claim on habeas review—that he had been denied his 
Article 36 right to consular notification—because Bustillo had failed 
to raise that claim at trial or on appeal.65 
In the U.S. Supreme Court, Bustillo argued that the Justices should 
reconsider the Court‘s procedural-default holding in Breard in light 
of the ICJ‘s decisions in LaGrand and Avena.66 Chief Justice Roberts 
noted the argument of several amici that the United States is 
obligated to comply with the ICJ‘s interpretation of the VCCR.67 
Nevertheless, the Court adhered to its prior holding in Breard that 
procedural-default rules apply to treaty claims ―no less‖ than to 
claims arising out of the U.S. Constitution itself.68 
2. An International-Law Perspective on Sanchez-Llamas 
In Sanchez-Llamas, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed for the first 
time the domestic effect of a binding judgment by an international 
tribunal.69 Thus, the Court had the opportunity to consider the merits 
of what one international-law scholar has termed a ―new world court 
order.‖70 The new world court order describes a relationship between 
domestic courts and international tribunals whereby domestic courts 
―act independently to comply with international tribunal judgments 
with little or no interference by the legislative or executive branches 
of a nation‘s government.‖71   
The Sanchez-Llamas Court, however, not only rejected the 
proposition that it was bound by the ICJ‘s judgments but also 
asserted that U.S. courts need not follow the ICJ‘s interpretations of 
the VCCR.72  
It is important to understand this ruling in perspective. Was the 
 
64. 548 U.S. 331, 340–41 (2006). 
65. Id. at 341–42. 
66. Id. at 353. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 360 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per 
curiam)). 
69. Julian Ku, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: Stepping Back from the New World 
Court Order, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 18 (2007).  
70. Id. See also Julian Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court 
Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
71. Ku, supra note 69, at 18. 
72. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 348; Ku, supra note 69, at 18. 
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U.S. Supreme Court sharply divided on this issue—politically, 
ideologically, or otherwise? Was the Court‘s decision, albeit on a 
novel point of law, a significant departure from its prior international 
jurisprudence? Did the Court act boldly and broadly in so holding, or 
did it wisely confine itself to the issue at hand? 
First, although the U.S. Supreme Court was politically and 
ideologically divided in Sanchez-Llamas, it unanimously refuted the 
new-world-court-order contention that the Court was obligated to 
adhere to the ICJ‘s judgments, even if those judgments contravened 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent or the view of the U.S. executive 
branch.73 In fact, ―[n]ot one justice endorsed or adopted‖ the 
philosophy of the new world court order.74 Therefore, at least as far as 
the narrow issues involved in Sanchez-Llamas are concerned, the 
Court‘s stance on international judicial comity cannot fairly be 
characterized as one reflecting the closed-mindedness of an arch-
conservative, five-member majority. 
Second, critics of the Sanchez-Llamas majority should bear in 
mind that the executive and legislative branches of the United States 
have a ―well-established‖ power to violate or refuse to comply with 
international legal obligations, including those arising out of ratified 
treaties.75 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted in the 1888 
case of Whitney v. Robertson, which involved a self-executing trade 
agreement with the Dominican Republic, that, if a statute and a self-
executing treaty are inconsistent, ―the one last in date will control the 
other.‖76 This is the so-called ―last-in-time rule.‖77  
Similarly, while the Court stated in The Paquete Habana in 1900 
that ―[i]nternational law is part of our law,‖ it also suggested that 
customary international law may be superseded by a controlling act 
of the executive branch.78 Thus, ―[g]iven the long tradition of non-
judicial enforcement of international tribunal judgments and the 
actual non-judicial mechanisms for enforcement contained in the ICJ 
system itself [e.g., the UN Security Council], the Court wisely gave 
 
73. Ku, supra note 69, at 18. 
74. Id. at 28. 
75. Id. at 26. 
76. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See also Ku, supra note 69, at 26. 
77. Ku, supra note 69, at 26. 
78. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Ku, supra note 69, at 26. While Ku 
considers Justice Gray‘s suggestion about executive acts to be a holding, the 
statement may reasonably be read as mere dictum. 
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greater weight to the executive branch‖ than to the judgment of the 
ICJ.79 
Finally, although the aforementioned international-law scholar 
supports much of the Court‘s decision in Sanchez-Llamas, he 
suggests that its brief analysis of the status of ICJ judgments ―leaves 
much to be desired.‖80 This is important, the scholar stresses, because 
the United States is party to a number of other tribunal systems and 
treaties that, like the VCCR, confer jurisdiction on the ICJ.81 The 
scholar‘s principal complaint is that Chief Justice Roberts‘ majority 
opinion failed to provide a detailed analytical framework to assist 
courts, practicing attorneys, and academics in assessing the status of 
international-tribunal judgments.82 
Clarity is certainly a virtue in any court opinion, and it is the 
special duty of the U.S. Supreme Court to provide guidance to lower 
courts and the legal community. But it is equally important for the 
Court to limit itself, as it did in Sanchez-Llamas, to the particular 
issues dispositive to the case at hand. Especially in the often-
unchartered territory of international law, this Note takes the position 
that the Court should proceed at the slow and steady pace of the 
common law, avoiding overbroad pronouncements in anticipation, 
rather than resolution, of a given case. 
III. REASONING 
Part III explains the respective approaches of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the U.S. Supreme Court on three 
closely related issues: whether the VCCR is self-executing,83 whether 
the ICJ‘s judgment on a VCCR claim is binding on domestic courts,84 
and whether a domestic court is required to follow the ICJ‘s 
interpretation of the VCCR.85  
A. Whether the VCCR Is Self-Executing 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht declared in no uncertain terms that 
Article 36 of the VCCR requires no lawmaking for its execution but 
 
79. Ku, supra note 69, at 26. 
80. Id. at 24. 
81. Id. at 19. 
82. Id. at 18–19. 
83. See infra Part III.A. 
84. See infra Part III.B. 
85. See infra Part III.C. 
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rather is ―self-executing.‖86 The court explained that Article 36, 
which occupies the status of federal law in Germany, contains 
provisions that are directly relevant to German criminal procedure, 
including preliminary proceedings—particularly when the accused is 
a foreign national of a signatory country to the VCCR.87 Therefore, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht reasoned, the norm established by 
Article 36 is sufficiently definite to be applied directly by German 
law-enforcement officials.88 
In Medellín, however, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to reach 
the question of whether the VCCR is self-executing, explaining that 
the narrow question on review was whether the Avena judgment is 
binding on domestic courts.89 Nevertheless, in an illustration of the 
Court‘s division on these issues,90 Justice Breyer wrote for three other 
justices in his Sanchez-Llamas dissent that ―it is common ground‖ 
that the VCCR is self-executing.91 In a jab to the Sanchez-Llamas 
majority, the Bundesverfassungsgericht cited this statement from 
Justice Breyer‘s dissent alongside its own conclusion that the VCCR 
is a self-executing treaty.92 
B. Whether an ICJ Judgment on a VCCR Claim Is Binding on 
Domestic Courts 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht made clear that German public 
authorities are constitutionally bound by the ICJ‘s decision on a 
VCCR claim in a case to which Germany is a party.93 This is true, 
however, only where Germany has voluntarily submitted to the ICJ‘s 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that, if 
Germany had not ratified the Optional Protocol, the court would not 
have been required by the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) to 
consider the ICJ‘s decsions on claims arising out of the VCCR.94 As 
noted above, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol 
 
86. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 53. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.4 (2008). 
90. See supra note 5. 
91. 548 U.S. 331, 372 (2006). 
92. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 53. 
93. Id. para. 60. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, 
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062, 3 Bevans 1179, 1190 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
94. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 60. See also ICJ Statute, supra note 93, 59 
Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190. 
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on March 7, 2005, subsequent to the ICJ‘s decision in Avena.95  
Although the Bundesverfassungsgericht concluded in accordance 
with Article 59 of the ICJ Statute96 that the binding effect of an ICJ 
judgment applies only between the parties and in respect of the 
particular case,97 the Bundesverfassungsgericht also suggested that 
ICJ decisions may have a domestic legal effect beyond the confines 
of Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.98 Based on the ICJ‘s determination in 
Avena that ―the clemency process, as currently practised within the 
United States criminal justice system,‖ is ―not sufficient in itself to 
serve as an appropriate means of ‗review and reconsideration,‘‖99 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that decisions of the ICJ have 
domestic legal effect when, as in the case of the Turkish national, 
individual rights are at issue.100 Thus, as a matter of German 
constitutional law, ICJ judgments may have some domestic legal 
authority even with respect to cases to which Germany is not a party. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht makes clear, however, that ICJ 
judgments do not overrule domestic judgments.101 Therefore, the 
precise manner by which the judgments take legal effect cannot be 
determined solely on the basis of international law.102   
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court found that, of the Optional 
Protocol, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute, none 
―creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing 
legislation . . . .‖103 And ―because it is uncontested that no such 
legislation exists,‖ the Avena judgment does not constitute 
―automatically binding domestic law.‖104  
However, the Court did not decide the question of whether the 
binding force of an ICJ judgment—like an ICJ interpretation—
 
95. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
96. The ICJ Statute organizes the composition and the functioning of the 
International Court of Justice. See ICJ Statute, supra note 93. 
97. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 59. See also ICJ Statute, supra note 93, 59 
Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190. 
98. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 59. See also ICJ Statute, supra note 93, 59 
Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190. 
99. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12, 66 (Mar. 31). 
100. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 59.  
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008). 
104. Id. 
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warrants only ―respectful consideration.‖105 Finding this issue ―not 
clear,‖ Chief Justice Roberts wrote in dictum that ―nothing suggests‖ 
that the ICJ considers its judgments enforceable in the domestic 
courts of VCCR signatory nations.106 Furthermore, the fact that the 
United States may conduct the required review and reconsideration 
by means of its own choosing, together with the ICJ‘s ―mere 
suggestion‖ that the ―judicial process‖ is the best means of providing 
such review, confirms that domestic enforceability is not ―part and 
parcel of an ICJ judgment.‖107 
C. Whether a Domestic Court Must Follow the ICJ’s 
Interpretation of the VCCR 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that German courts are 
constitutionally required to consider ICJ decisions on VCCR 
claims.108 In this case, the court found that the Bundesgerichtshof had 
violated the Grundgesetz because its interpretation of Article 36(1)(b) 
of the VCCR contradicted that of the ICJ in LaGrand and Avena.109 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht summarized the inconsistency as 
follows. 
In contrast to the Bundesgerichtshof, the ICJ determined that 
Article 36(1) creates a subjective right to consular support, 
effectively recognizing the individual‘s right to defend himself.110 All 
law-enforcement officials, including the arresting police in the 
preliminary proceedings, are required to inform individuals of this 
right.111 By international law, a violation of these rights calls for 
review of the defendant‘s sentence.112 The purpose of the notification 
requirement in Article 36(1)(b) is to enable the individual to enjoy 
the support provided for in Article 36(1)(c).113   
The Bundesverfassungsgericht explained that, as a matter of 
German constitutional law, a failure to adequately consider an ICJ 
decision violates the claimant‘s constitutional right to a fair process 
in accordance with the freedom-of-action provision of the 
 
105. Id. at 513. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 48.  
109. Id. 
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Grundgesetz114 and the principle of due process.115 The constitutional 
right to a fair process is derived not only from the norms of German 
criminal procedure but also from principles of international law.116 
Indeed, the respect for international law (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit) 
inherent in the Grundgesetz requires that German courts interpret the 
Grundgesetz as consistently as possible with Germany‘s international 
legal obligations.117 The Bundesverfassungsgericht thus directed the 
Bundesgerichtshof to determine on remand the consequences of the 
constitutional violation on the Turkish national‘s criminal 
proceedings.118 
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in Medellín that U.S. courts 
must give only ―respectful consideration‖ to the interpretation of a 
treaty rendered by a competent international court.119 The U.S. 
Constitution provides that the ―judicial Power of the United States,‖ 
which extends to treaties, is ―vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.‖120 This judicial power includes the duty ―to say what 
the law is.‖121 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in Sanchez-Llamas, 
for treaties to be given effect as federal law in the U.S. legal system, 
determining their meaning as a matter of federal law must remain 
―emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,‖ 
 
114. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2(1). The so-called freedom-of-
action (Handlungsfreiheit) provision of the Grundgesetz states that ―[e]very person 
shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not 
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral 
law.‖ Id. 
115. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 48. 
116. Id. para. 52. Pursuant to the Grundgesetz, ―[t]reaties that regulate the 
political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation shall 
require the consent or participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies 
responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal law.‖ GG art. 59(2). 
117. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 54. U.S. jurisprudence contains a similar 
doctrine, the Charming Betsy Canon, which provides that ―an act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .‖ Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 
(1804). The canon was discussed in neither Sanchez-Llamas nor Medellín, 
however, presumably because it applies to a court‘s interpretation of an act of 
Congress rather than a treaty.  
118. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 48. 
119. 552 U.S. 491, 513 n.9 (2008) (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 
(1998) (per curiam)). 
120. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. 
121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353 (2006). 
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headed by the one Supreme Court established by the U.S. 
Constitution.122 
With respect to the VCCR in particular, Chief Justice Roberts 
reasoned that neither the structure nor the purpose of the ICJ suggests 
that its interpretations were ―intended to be conclusive‖ on U.S. 
courts.123 Indeed, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that ICJ 
decisions have ―no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case.‖124 Thus, a majority of the Supreme 
Court found in Sanchez-Llamas and reaffirmed in Medellín that there 
is ―little reason‖ to think that the ICJ‘s interpretations of the VCCR 
are binding on U.S. courts.125 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht and the U.S. Supreme Court have 
expressed different viewpoints on whether the VCCR is self-
executing,126 whether the ICJ‘s judgment on a VCCR claim is binding 
on domestic courts,127 and whether a domestic court is required to 
follow the ICJ‘s interpretations of the VCCR.128 Part IV highlights 
two key points that may put the courts‘ decisions into better 
perspective. 
First, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explained that ICJ decisions 
serve to orient signatory states to the ICJ‘s authoritative 
understanding of the VCCR and thus can help the states to avoid 
future violations of the treaty.129 But the ICJ‘s interpretations of the 
VCCR must serve as a normative guideline for German courts 
because, by ratifying the Optional Protocol, Germany has submitted 
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.130 The United States, on the 
other hand, withdrew from the Optional Protocol.131 As a result, Chief 
Justice Roberts considers it ―doubtful‖ that U.S. courts should give 
―decisive weight‖ to the interpretations of the ICJ when the United 
States no longer recognizes that tribunal‘s jurisdiction with respect to 
 
122. 548 U.S. at 353–54 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
123. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 354. 
124. ICJ Statute, supra note 93, 59 Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190. 
125. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355. See also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 518. 
126. See supra Part III.A. 
127. See supra Part III.B. 
128. See supra Part III.C. 
129. BVerfG Case, supra note 1, para. 61. 
130. Id. para. 60. 
131. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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claims arising out of the VCCR.132  
Second, procedural-default rules play a more significant role in an 
adversarial system, such as that of the United States, than in the 
inquisitorial legal system characteristic of Germany and many of the 
other VCCR signatory states.133 In an inquisitorial system, the 
magistrate—a representative of the state—may be held accountable 
for the failure to raise a legal issue.134 In an adversarial system, 
however, this responsibility generally rests with the individual parties 
themselves.‖135 Thus, not only was the United States not required to 
adopt the ICJ‘s interpretation of the VCCR; that interpretation was, at 
least to a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, ―inconsistent with the 
basic framework of [the] adversary system.‖136 
As Justice Stevens explained in his Medellín concurrence, ―One 
consequence of our form of government is that sometimes States 
must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor and 
integrity of the Nation.‖137 Hence, in Medellín—where ―the honor of 
the Nation [was] balanced against [only a] modest cost of 
compliance‖138 and the entire U.S. Supreme Court agreed with 
President George W. Bush ―that breach [of the VCCR] will 
jeopardize the United States‘ ‗plainly compelling‘ interests in 
‗ensuring the reciprocal observance of the [VCCR], protecting 
relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment 
to the role of international law‘‖139—the Court did well to respect our 
federal structure of government and the constitutional separation of 
powers. 
This analysis suggests that both the Bundesverfassungsgericht and 
the U.S. Supreme Court were reasonable in their interpretations and 
applications of the law. Their decisions are not inconsistent but rather 
differ on account of the law that each court had to consider.  
V. CONCLUSION 
One commentator has written that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
 
132. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355. 




137. 552 U.S. 491, 536 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
138. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
139. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Id. at 524). 
HEINLEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:51 PM 
2010] IS ANY CONSTITUTIONAL COURT REALLY COSMOPOLITAN? 335 
effectively ―reinforce[d] U.S. insularity in a world of norms and 
institutions that can only function effectively if the United States 
participates willingly and complies with its international 
obligations.‖140 That may well be true. But the commentator may be 
mistaken in concluding that, while in recent years the executive 
branch has ―marched to its own tune‖ in the international arena, now 
the U.S. Supreme Court has ―quite unnecessarily joined in.‖141 It was 
the executive branch that withdrew the United States from the 
Optional Protocol after the ICJ‘s judgment in Avena, not the federal 
judiciary.142 Thus, despite exhortations that our Supreme Court adopt 
a ―more cosmopolitan approach,‖143 this Note takes the position that a 
court can be only as cosmopolitan as reasonable interpretation and 
application of the law permits.  
 
 
140. Kirgis, supra note 8, at 637. 
141. Id. 
142. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500. 
143. Kirgis, supra note 8, at 637. 
